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Governance as a critical factor to improve institutional performance has 
become an area of interest across many disciplines (Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden, 2004; Chhotray and Stoker, 2009) including public 
health, where its potential impact in the well being of large segments of 
the population is enormous (WHO, 2008). However, consensus on 
meanings and measurements of governance has proved elusive, with 
many different elements of public function often mentioned as 
indicators or dimensions of good governance (Grindle, 2007; Baez-
Camargo et al., forthcoming). Among these elements, accountability is 
increasingly regarded as a key lever for reform (George, 2003; 
Brinkerhoff, 2004; Hammer et al, 2007; Lewis and Pettersson, 2009), 
one that when targeted can generate important spill over effects into the 
other elements associated with good governance.  
This paper argues for and develops in detail the idea that accountability 
is a key target for governance strengthening interventions in health 
systems. The premise is that, when accountability is strengthened and 
improved upon, the opportunity space for corruption to take place is 
diminished and governance outcomes of the health system such as 
responsiveness, equity and efficient use of resources are also affected 
positively. 
Accountability, however, suffers at the expense of its own success. Its 
exact meaning has remained a contested issue, with an ensuing 
proliferation in interpretations, definitions, uses, misuses and abuses of 
the concept (see Linberg, 2009 for an excellent literature review of this 
phenomenon). One of the main reasons for this state of confusion is that 
accountability is a complex concept and, as such, hard to pin down. It is 
prone to conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970) and this, in turn, 
generates lack of analytical clarity and serious problems as to how to 
deal with accountability in empirical analyses. 
Accountability is indeed a broad concept that covers and permeates a 
vast array of relationships involving power and decision making 
authority across sectors and organizational strata of society and 
government. However, that does not mean that the obstacles to 
adequately define and operationalize this concept cannot be tackled in a 
systematic manner.  
The goals of this paper are threefold: a) to contribute an operational 
definition of accountability that takes into account its different 
dimensions, b) to discuss the main institutional challenges to 
accountability involved in the provision of public health services and, 
with that as a basis, c) to propose general guidelines for a better 
empirical application of this concept. These guidelines to empirically 
assess accountability are expected to help in pinpointing when and why 
accountability relations in the health sector may be weak and are 
therefore potentially useful as a tool for intervention design in health 
systems strengthening. 
In this paper attention is paid mainly to the case of low-income 
countries, where urgent health needs often coexist with less than 
optimal governance conditions in the public sector. The arguments will  






focus on institutional requirements for better accountability in public 
healthcare provision. This represents a first step in conceptualizing 
routes to improve health system performance.1  
Finally, it should be noted that assessing accountability is not 
understood as an end in and of itself. It should be an important part of a 
broader toolkit for assessing quality of governance and should be taken 
into consideration alongside other critical governance dimensions (for 
example strategic vision and policy design) that also have a substantial 
impact on governance outcomes such as responsiveness, equity and 
allocative efficiency which are the ones that ultimately have a direct 
effect on the social impact of public health service provision.  
2. Definition of accountability and components 
Following Lindberg (2009: 5) accountability can be understood as one 
of several concepts that fall under the more general category of 
‘methods of limiting power’ (of which others are devolution of power, 
violence, economic pressure, public shame, and so forth). Specifically, 
accountability necessarily involves decision-making power that is 
delegated, and the means to prevent the misuse or abuse of such power.2  
Accountability is here defined as a process within a principal-agent 
relationship3 through which the behaviour and performance of the agent 
is evaluated against predetermined standards by the principal and where 
misdeeds are sanctioned.4 When applied to public service provision, 
accountability can be understood as ‘the spectrum of approaches, 
mechanisms and practices used by the stakeholders concerned with 
public services to ensure a desired level and type of performance’ (Paul, 
1992: 1047).  
Following the World Bank’s seminal (2004) discussion, there are five 
components that need be present for accountable relations to take place 
in public governance: delegation, financing, performance, information 
about performance, and enforceability. By defining accountability in the 
above manner and spelling out these components, it becomes clear that 
several distinct steps need to be taken in order to achieve an 
accountable agent-principal relationship. Figure 1 illustrates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
1  However, it should also be acknowledged that, especially in developing 
countries, informal institutions and networks often play a role in shaping 
behaviours and decisions that affect the degree to which stakeholders in health 
systems are accountable to each other (for a methodological discussion on how 
to evaluate informal accountability relationships see Jacobs, forthcoming).  
2  Though it could be argued that mutual accountability, as seen between donors 
and recipient countries, does not necessarily imply such vertical subordination.  
3  A principal-agent relationship refers to the arrangement that exists when one 
person or entity (called the agent) acts on behalf of another (called the principal). 
4  Though in this broad sense accountability is a concept that can be applied to any 
relationship where a delegation of functions is involved, within the discussion of 
accountability as a governance attribute the attention here goes to the often 
political and power-laden relationships among citizens, politicians and 
government officials, and providers of public services. 










Figure 1 Components for Accountable Principal-Agent Relations, author 
based on World Bank (2004) 
  
 
The first step is delegation. This entails that there is an explicit mandate 
about what is expected from the agent. Communicating the tasks and 
duties that are delegated to the agent falls within the responsibility of 
the principal (or a representative of the principal). Defining how public 
services will be supplied involves clearly specifying duties, expected 
targets, outcomes and guidelines for the accepted methods to attain 
them.  
Secondly, financing, or availability of resources, is also an essential 
ingredient for accountability because there must be a minimum of 
congruence between ends and means when delegating any function. In 
other words, the principal should endow the agent with adequate and 
sufficient resources to carry out the mandate. If the agent lacks the 
means and resources to perform as specified, then a basic foundation in 
the agent-principal relationship is lacking and enforcing sanctions for 
lack of compliance would be both unreasonable and unfair.   
Third, after the agent has been given a mandate and resources to carry it 
out, then it is up to the agent to actually perform as agreed upon. The 
actual results or deliverables from performing the delegated tasks are at 
the heart of the principal agent relationship.  
A separate but equally important component of the accountability 
relationship is the transmission of information to the principal about 
how the agent has performed the mandate. This involves monitoring 
performance and target achievement in a transparent manner (which can 
be carried out by a third party), but also an active process through 
which the agent can explain its decisions and justify its actions. 






Enforceability comes as the final step on the side of the principal. Once 
the agent is given a mandate and the resources to carry it out, there also 
have to be means available to sanction non-compliance and/or 
wrongdoing for the principal-agent relationship to be meaningful. 
Without effective enforcement mechanisms and sanctions, 
accountability is lacking an essential component. 
By looking at its different components, it becomes evident that 
accountability is a multidimensional concept, one that describes an 
ongoing process between stakeholders involving several qualitatively 
different steps. Building on from this definition, the following section 
discusses how accountability can be better understood for the specific 
case of public provision of health services. 
3. The long and short routes: an institutional map 
of accountability in public health service 
provision 
The health sector is one that naturally suffers from many instances of 
market failure, especially regarding the needs of the most vulnerable 
groups in society. For this reason, it is an observable fact that the state 
across the world is involved, in many different forms and degrees, in 
the provision of healthcare. However, by its very nature, this role of the 
state as an intermediary between patients and health service providers 
generates serious challenges.  
Figure 2 illustrates an expanded version of the World Bank’s model of 
accountability in public services. The diagram describes two routes of 
accountability, short and long.  
	  
Figure 2 Model for accountability routes in the provision of public health 
services, author based on World Bank (2004) 
The short route, or direct accountability, is where client power is 
exercised directly, where the principal can effectively enforce 
accountability in the relationship. An example of direct accountability is 
provided by competitive market relationships where consumers have 
access to alternative sources of provision of goods and services. 
Consumers in that context can hold providers directly accountable 
because, if they find that the quality of the goods and/or services 






provided is not acceptable, they can directly sanction the provider by 
taking their business elsewhere.  
However, as mentioned before, uncoordinated market competition in 
healthcare can fail to provide these goods and services in socially 
desirable quantities, especially for the most vulnerable groups. States, 
therefore, typically take on a large responsibility for the regulation, 
provision and financing of health services. As Figure 2 illustrates, in 
this indirect accountability route the policy makers act as intermediaries 
between the citizens/patients and the providers of health services, 
thereby creating a two-step process.  
The first step involves that the demands and needs of patients be made 
known to the policymakers so that they can be incorporated into the 
formulation of policy objectives. This is often captured in the way of 
political electoral platforms over which political parties compete for 
votes, but is also closely related to how and by whom the information 
regarding the health needs of the population is compiled. In other 
words, this part of the process refers to whether citizens have a say with 
regards to the public provision of health services, and whether they 
have the ability to react and to discipline policymakers when and if they 
fail to fulfil their political mandate. The ability of citizens to bring 
authorities into account is related to the character of the political regime 
(degree of democracy or authoritarianism) that operates in any given 
context.  
The second part of the long accountability route involves the process 
through which the authorities implement the policies and regulations to 
address the health needs of the population and ensure that service 
provision is performed in a satisfactory manner. This is related to public 
administration and the manner in which the public institutions of the 
health sector are setup. 
The long and short routes present different and substantial challenges to 
the implementation of accountable provision of public health services, 
especially in the case of lower income countries. These challenges are 
discussed next. 
4. The long accountability route: high institutional 
complexity and stability requirements. 
The long accountability route in public services involves two sets of 
principal/agent actors: with government officials and policymakers 
being simultaneously agent and principal vis-à-vis the citizens and the 
service providers respectively. These relationships, on the “regime” side 
and on the “public administration” side of the public service provision 
model, are qualitatively different and therefore the accountability 
mechanisms that are relevant for each are different as well.  
On the regime side, accountability involves broad institutional 
mechanisms through which government officials and citizens interact 
and which are mostly determined by the political characteristics of each 
regime. The literature on political regimes and regime transitions is vast 
and it shows that many different political configurations through which 
societies interact with their political authorities can emerge out of 






complex patterns of historic-cultural trajectories.5 These political 
patterns determine who participates and how in the political process and 
the means through which government officials exercise power. On the 
public administration side, the accountability relationships between 
government officials and service providers are mostly determined by 
processes internal to the state which can be affected by regime type, but 
may also operate on a different political and technical rationale.  
It is important to note that in the case of the provision of public 
services, the performance component of accountability in the regime 
side is displaced to the realm of action of a different set of agents; the 
service providers. Thus, while political authorities should in principle 
remain accountable to citizens for provision of basic services, the actual 
delivery is performed by agents who respond to incentives embedded in 
the public administration side of the long accountability route. 
	  
Figure 3 Model for the long accountability route in the provision of public 
health services, author based on World Bank (2004). 
The consequence is that substantial institutional requirements are 
needed from the public sector and the broader political system for this 
long accountability route to function properly. Figure 3 illustrates the 
components for accountable relationships between the relevant sets of 
principal/agents involved in the provision of health services. This model 
suggests that accountability in public service provision requires 
differentiated functional capabilities of the state apparatus, which poses 
a tremendous challenge to states with weak and/or ill functioning state 
institutions and bureaucracies. There are at least three reasons for this:  
First, the ‘long accountability route’ increases the institutional space 
through which public service delivery must take place and thus also 
increases the probability of breakdown or “government failure” along 
the way. As Hammer et al. (2007: 4052) point out, there are two types 
of possible government failure within this framework: 1) when the 
policymaker does not successfully capture or act in accordance to what 
people want and need; 2) when policy makers are unable to generate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  The volume of works on political systems, their origins, character and direction 
is enormous. However, key works relevant to the nature and direction of 
political regimes in developing countries and democracy in particular should 
include (Carothers, 1999; Dahl, 1971; Diamond, Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, 
1988; Diamond, 1999; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). 






incentives needed for public servants and service providers to 
appropriately address the interests of the people.  
The first type can involve not only cases of lack of responsiveness due 
to the undemocratic nature of the regime, but also cases where due to 
failures in adequate data generation and collection the authorities do not 
possess accurate information of actual health needs among the 
population. 
The second type includes the case where the state lacks the ability to 
effectively exercise the oversight and monitoring function over service 
providers as well as where the state lacks the ability to enforce 
sanctions. 
Secondly, the modern state is composed of a highly intricate web of 
institutions throughout which decision-making power is dispersed. 
Thus, potential accountability links are abundant. The issue then 
becomes elucidating which configuration of state institutions is 
adequate to optimize good, accountable provision of public health 
services. The current post-colonial state in many developing countries is 
characterized by highly centralized decision making and restricted 
democratic practices, which is a combination that poses serious 
difficulties to the effectiveness of health service delivery.  
Where democratic processes are limited or weak, the governments tend 
to be accountable (if at all) to networks of already privileged actors 
(capitalists, the landed, labour aristocracy) who can exercise political 
pressure at the central level. The centralized decision making that often 
characterises less than democratic regimes works against poor people 
having voice and being empowered principals, as their entry point to the 
public health system is with community or district level service 
providers who have the least incentives to be accountable to them, 
being all the way down in a centralized decision making structure.6  
Thus, the question is whether the adequate incentives exist for both 
government officials and health service providers to be accountable to 
citizens/patients.  
A third challenge to accountable provision of public health services is 
the need for institutional stability. Accountability is an on-going, 
dynamic process involving repeated interactions between principals and 
agents. On the one hand, information needs to flow in both directions 
with a clear mandate to the agents and information provided back to the 
principals about the agent’s performance. On the other hand, the 
principal (or a representative of the principal) is required to perform an 
assessment of whether the observed outcomes are actually in line with 
the original mandate, including the evaluation of results and whether the 
proper steps or rules were followed in attaining the results.  After that 
exchange is completed the principal may determine which actions 
(whether sanctions or rewards) are in order. The fact that this process of 
information transmission, evaluation and execution needs to be repeated 
regularly through time places high demands on institutional stability 
that many regimes in the developing world lack. The question is, then, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 	   This is not to say that the formal structures of the state in developing countries 
are centralized. Quite the contrary, in countless examples delivery of public 
health services is extremely decentralized. The argument here is that political 
decision making power is typically quite centralized in less than democratic 
countries, which does not promote direct accountability of health service 
providers to patients in the public sector. 






whether there is sufficient stability and continuity in the institutional 
setup and the actors involved in public health service delivery to allow 
the process of accountability to take place in an adequate manner. 
In sum, the long accountability route in the delivery of public health 
services necessitates well functioning complex institutional 
configurations that adequately provide incentives for accountability of 
decision makers vis-à-vis patients and that are stable.  
5. The short accountability route: market failure 
and enforcement challenges 
Because of high demands on institutional performance that full 
accountability along the long route pose, the case is often made that 
efforts should be focused on strengthening the short accountability 
route. This approach, also associated with the concept of social 
accountability, has been increasingly gaining acceptance among 
development practitioners (see for example, Agarwal, Heltberg and 
Diachok, 2009) and involves empowering citizens to enforce 
accountability directly from providers.  
The concept of strengthening the ability of communities and grassroots 
movements to enforce accountability from service providers makes 
particular sense in the context of weak state institutions, where reforms 
to improve and consolidate institutions of the state involve too many 
uncertainties and can take too long to show results, but where 
nonetheless urgent health needs demand more immediate action. There 
are, however, challenges involved in establishing direct accountability 
links between citizens/consumers and public service providers that 
should also be taken into consideration. Understanding these challenges 
requires examining the ways in which direct accountability can be 
implemented. Paul (1992:1048) has pointed out that there are two main 
mechanisms through which direct accountability may be exercised: 
voice and exit.  
Voice refers to the ability of patients (customers) to participate or 
protest to induce service providers to perform. However, for voice to be 
effective it is necessary that the providers and/or public sector be 
responsive to begin with.  Not surprisingly, the effectiveness of voice as 
a mechanism to improve direct accountability is directly linked to the 
incentives and constraints given by the overall institutional framework 
dictating policymaking and health service provision. The nature of the 
political regime determines the availability and effectiveness of 
participatory channels through which patients might be able to express 
their needs and demands. It also determines the responsiveness of 
policymakers to discontent at the grassroots level. The degree to which 
decision making in the public health sector is centralized and the ability 
of the public sector to enforce its decisions across the public sphere also 
plays a big part on whether service providers are responsive to patient 
discontent.  
Also, the use of voice can be problematic as a tool to enforce 
accountability because it can be unequally distributed among the 
population as a function of income, education and related attributes, 
biasing the situation against the most vulnerable groups.   






Therefore, the effectiveness of voice as a mechanism to strengthen 
direct accountability hinges on two factors: 1) are the relevant decision 
makers receptive to participatory methods of demand articulation from 
patients? and 2) are patients empowered sufficiently to be able to 
adequately voice their concerns and demands?  
Exit refers to whether competing sources of supply for service provision 
exist and is easily observed in well-functioning markets. Through 
competition and choice of provider, patients (customers) are able to 
punish or reward performance directly and effectively; if the good or 
service is not satisfactory they simply take their business elsewhere.  
Exit is a very effective mechanism because it provides immediate 
enforceability: it involves a very clear and direct sanctioning or 
punishment to providers who do not perform according to standard. 
From the providers’ perspective, this generates strong incentives to 
commit to customer satisfaction. Also, exit as an enforcement 
mechanism in direct accountability has the great advantage relative to 
the long accountability route that it takes information on performance, 
monitoring and enforceability to the micro (individual) level, 
eliminating many of the macro institutional demands on the generation 
and diffusion of performance information, monitoring, enforceability, 
and so forth.    
However, exit as a means for enforcing accountability in public sector 
provision can be difficult to attain where the provision of public goods 
is particularly vulnerable to market failure. As Paul (1992: 1050) also 
points out: ‘Exit is more efficient, and hence more likely to be used in 
services least affected by market failure whereas voice is relatively 
more efficient as market failure increases.’ As is clear in many 
instances exit can simply not be an option where resource constraints 
and/or geographical characteristics impede the ability of patients to 
access other providers.  
Thus the dilemma is the following: where market failure is a problem, 
empowering patients/consumers through greater participatory channels 
to articulate their demands and concerns can be a means to improve 
direct accountability. Voice is, however, a potentially less effective 
mechanism to establish direct accountability because it does not 
necessarily involve the ability to enforce a sanction or punishment when 
performance is not satisfactory and the ability to exercise it can be 
unequally distributed among the population with a bias against the more 
vulnerable groups.   
For voice to work as a mechanism to improve direct accountability 
there has to be a) responsiveness on the part of the service providers 
and/or authorities and b) local groups need be adequately empowered 
through effective participatory channels as well as accurate information 
about their rights. These two dimensions in turn, are likely to be related 
to the institutional rules governing the political and well as the public 
administration arena.  
6. Assessing accountability: methodology and 
rationale 
As it is clear from the preceding two sections, both the long and short 
accountability routes present distinct and potentially substantial 






challenges. Neither one is a priori better than the other from a purely 
conceptual point of view. Rather, from an implementer’s perspective 
the relevant question is, for a given case, which areas across the two 
routes present the best opportunities to improve the delivery of health 
services?  
Therefore, in order to assess accountability in public health service 
provision through both the long and short routes, it is necessary to map 
out and evaluate the critical institutional junctions in the health sector 
where accountability provisions are most likely to have a systemic 
impact on performance, while taking into account the political realities 
of each case to evaluate the feasibility of potential intervention entry 
points. This section begins the discussion on how to correctly conduct 
an empirical assessment of accountability in public health services. 
As has been argued above, accountability is not an output or an 
outcome, but rather a process. This implies that assessing accountability 
should involve looking at whether the different steps involved in 
achieving accountability within an institutional relationship are present 
or not. So far this paper has proposed to define accountability as a 
dynamic process in a principal-agent relationship that, in order to be 
effective in public governance, must include five essential components 
(delegation, financing, performance, monitoring and enforceability). 
Also, in the previous discussion, the requirements for accountable 
relationships in public service provision have been reviewed from an 
institutional perspective, addressing what are the institutional 
requirements and challenges for accountability to be effectively 
observed. Building on these two elements this section establishes 
concrete criteria to evaluate accountability in the provision of public 
health services. 
At the most general level, the aim of the researcher is to evaluate how 
the institutional status quo fares in terms of making health service 
provision responsive to patients’ needs in an accountable manner. The 
methodology proposed here involves combining institutional analysis 
with rational choice assumptions on the behaviour of public officials 
and service providers (see Scharpf, 1997 for an extensive description of 
this type of methodological approach).  
The methodological emphasis on institutionalism derives from the 
notion that it is through rules and institutions that incentives and 
constraints are defined (North, 1990), which make them crucial to 
consider in any governance framework. Thus the task is to figure out, 
given the institutional status quo, what are the motivations for the 
relevant agents to be accountable? In other words, evaluating 
accountability requires first of all determining to whom public sector 
employees are accountable according to the existing regulatory 
framework.  
The rational choice approach assumes that service providers and public 
sector employees will seek to pursue the course of action that better 
promotes their personal interests subject to the incentives and 
constraints given by the institutional setting in which they must operate. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that actors will have clear interests to be 
accountable to those who have decision-making power over their status, 
career path or wealth.  
The institutional framework, by establishing hierarchies, patterns of 
interaction as well as rules and responsibilities, conveys already an 
implied distribution of power among the different stakeholders. It is 






important to discern this distribution of power because it unveils who 
are actually endowed with the decision-making ability to affect the 
behaviour of key health system actors. 
More concretely, to assess the elements that make a difference in 
making public service providers accountable one could start by 
assessing enforcement abilities, by asking 1) where and by whom 
decisions are made regarding the career paths of the providers and state 
officials and 2) how and by whom decisions are made about the flow of 
resources and staff remuneration (including how payment is linked or 
not to performance and how prospective wage increases or bonuses are 
decided). 
The responses to these questions will determine which of the 
accountability routes (long or short) is most likely to make a difference 
on service providers´ behaviour. For example, when promotion or 
remuneration decisions are linked to certain performance standards 
based on customer satisfaction surveys, then the providers will have 
stronger incentives to be responsive to patients´ needs. If, on the other 
hand, citizens´ inputs have no connection to remuneration or hiring or 
promotion decisions, then the providers will have little incentives to be 
responsive to patients.   
Similarly, one should trace the availability of enforcement mechanisms 
affecting policy makers by determining who are the relevant groups or 
actors involved in deciding whether policy makers have enough support 
to stay in power (individually or in partisan terms) and where the 
resources that fund state activities mostly come from. While in 
democratic political regimes accountability to citizens will tend to be 
higher than in authoritarian regimes, even in more pluralist systems 
political impact of different groups can vary substantially.  Likewise, in 
more centralized systems the accountability of public officials and 
service providers is likely to point upwards along the bureaucratic 
hierarchy towards the national level, whereas in more decentralized 
systems it is possible for local level officials and policy makers to have 
closer links to citizens/patients. 
7. General guidelines for assessing accountability 
As discussed in sections IV and V above, there are considerable 
institutional requirements involved in attaining effective accountability 
along the long route and substantial challenges in enforcing direct 
accountability in sectors like healthcare, which are vulnerable to market 
failure. The discussion above, however, does not suggest that it is 
necessary that all components function perfectly across entire regimes 
and health systems to achieve satisfactory accountability. The argument 
is that improving accountability in key institutional junctions and 
among key stakeholders can generate important positive effects across 
large institutional spaces.  
Thus, before presenting the guidelines to assess accountability, it should 
be clarified that, because the institutional web typically involved with 
the provision of public services is extensive and complex, the number 
of potential accountability relations in health systems is enormous. 
Since modern states are comprised of complex institutional networks, 
the specific elements that will be relevant for accountable relations in 
each case will vary depending on the particular issue being looked at as 






well as the wider country-specific situation. Therefore, it makes no 
sense to attempt to map all possible principal-agent relations for 
accountability assessment. Rather, the present guidelines are presented 
as a tool that can be applied to the analysis of specific instances or 
institutional junctions where red flags for governance concerns have 
been detected. 
What is here proposed is a problem-driven approach to the empirical 
assessment of critical accountability relationships. Because the 
institutional setup among health systems can vary so much and because 
each country faces unique challenges, the idea is that the starting point 
for the analysis be with a recognizable health system issue of concern 
(for example stock outs of essential medicines or access to antenatal 
care) and, with that as the focus, perform an institutional mapping of the 
institutions and agents involved in that specific instance or issue area to 
determine where the key junctions are where the system is more 
vulnerable and/or where disruptions have greater potential to generate 
systems-wide problems. At these junctions the accountability analysis is 
applied to determine more accurately the underlying problems. 
The following set of guidelines aims to provide analytical tools for the 
researcher to adapt according to the specific issue and context being 
studied.  Figure 4 illustrates some of the different functions that need to 
be carried out by different branches of the state in the long 
accountability route, as well as some of the interactions between 
citizens/patients and providers in the short accountability route. This 
provides a broad map to look at different institutional provisions 
governing accountability along the long and short routes, and also helps 
to unveil key stakeholders who may be actually exercising an influential 
role in determining who is accountable to whom in the health system. 
For example, looking at the democratic attributes of the regime, it is 
possible to determine whether political authorities are sensitive in 
reacting to public opinion, to certain influential pressure groups, or 
simply to the inner circle of political elites exercising political power. 
Similarly, looking at the sources determining the health budget, whether 
it is national level taxes, local level taxes or international donor funds, 
can give insights as to whom political authorities and service providers 
feel they need to respond to.     
The elements included in this figure are by no means exhaustive, it is 
only intended that this figure illustrate some areas within the public 
sector and health system where major accountability shortcomings may 
be found.   







Figure 4 Some functions conducive to promoting accountability along the 
two routes in the provision of public services, author based on 
World Bank (2004). 
Once critical institutional junctions within the health system have been 
identified for the issue being researched, a more specific inquiry into 
the existence of provisions for the five components of accountable 
relations can be performed. In general, the following points should be 
taken into consideration when assessing the required components for 
accountability in a principal/agent relationship:  
1) Clarity of the mandate is crucial. If the mandate is clear then it can 
be seen whether it has been correctly funded, can be monitored to 
see if it has been correctly performed, and a decision can be made 
about enforcing sanctions. Without a clear mandate the door is open 
to discretionary power to be misused or abused. So the specific 
questions to ask include: Is the mandate to policymakers and service 
providers clear? Is the mandate spelled out in a way that makes 
goals and the observance of guidelines measurable? Do documents 
exist with job descriptions that clearly spell out roles, functions and 
responsibilities? Are agents in key positions aware of what their 
mandate entails and requires of them? Do they have access to job 
description and rules and regulations as well as goal setting 
documents related to their work? 
2) Are there adequate mechanisms for financing that mandate? Who 
controls the budget? What are the main sources for financing health 
expenditures (for example national taxes, local taxes, insurances or 
donor funds)? Are the budgeted resources commensurate to the 
goals of the mandate? Are budgeted funds actually programmed 
into the disbursement plans of the Ministry of Finance (or relevant 
funding agency) so that they will be available to the agent in a 
predictable, timely fashion? Are service providers’ remunerations 
linked in any way to performance and/or patient satisfaction? Are 
budgeted resources actually transferred and received in the 
preordained amounts and at the specified intervals?  
3) Are there information gathering mechanisms to measure 
performance and goal attainment that are open and transparent? For 
example, are services providers required to maintain records of 






services rendered, of resources utilized, of days absent from work? 
Are these records actually kept in an accurate fashion? Is this 
information then relayed to the principals (or to officials 
representing the principals) who have the decision making power to 
evaluate how the mandate has been carried out? 
4) Are there transparent monitoring mechanisms to ensure proper 
behaviour of policymakers and service providers? Here the 
mechanisms can be multiple and can be internal (the state itself 
assessing its own performance) such as public audits, or external 
(external agencies or actors do the monitoring) such as ombudsmen, 
watchdog organizations, as well as diverse civil society groups and 
the media. How and to whom are the results and conclusions of the 
monitoring activities model known? Are monitoring mechanisms 
operative? Do inspectors show up when they are supposed to? Are 
there accessible routes for patients to complain/voice their 
grievances (through the justice system, for example)? 
5) Are there mechanisms to enforce disciplinary action when 
deviations from acceptable behaviour occur? Can government 
officials be voted out of office? Do service providers face sanctions 
for failing to attain targets or for acting outside the limits of the 
regulatory framework? Who is the agent or actor in charge of 
executing enforcement decisions and what is the information 
available to this decision maker? Are sanctions actually applied 
when the circumstances call for disciplinary action to be taken?  
6) This exercise aids in evaluating the institutional complexity of the 
health system in terms of the discussion in sections IV and V, 
revealing whether there are major legal and institutional gaps that 
need to be addressed. This analysis can contribute to evaluate not 
only the mere existence or rules and norms but also their internal 
consistency for the intended goal of ensuring accountability among 
key stakeholders. For example accountability can be expected to be 
higher in situations where those who hold power over career 
advancement and remuneration also have access to information on 
performance. If this is not the case, public sector officials will have 
decreased incentives to act in an accountable manner. In other 
words, it is not sufficient to generate reliable information on 
performance, but to ensure that such information is conveyed 
adequately to those with decision-making power over 
enforceability.  
As part of the institutional assessment, it is important to take into 
account the degree to which relevant decision-making is centralized. 
The more centralized decision-making is, the weakest we can assume 
the incentives of services providers to be receptive and accountable to 
patients. Accountability links, which are dictated by career and 
remuneration considerations, will tend to point upwards towards the 
centralized national level in those circumstances and not in the direction 
of patients. In these cases, the enforcement abilities of the central 
administrative decision makers should be strong in order for the long 
accountability route to be functional. 
Also, it should be taken into account that where political instability 
leads to weak institutional strength it is very unlikely that the repeated 
and predictable interactions needed to sustain accountability in a 
principal/agent relationship can be attained. When the key decision 
makers in the political and bureaucratic spheres have high turnover 






rates because of political unrest or instability, the enforcement and 
monitoring abilities of the state are seriously weakened.   
In those cases where the political regime and/or the public 
administration compact are substantially weak and unstable, where 
‘government failure’ indeed takes place, it is especially relevant to also 
look at the potential means to strengthen direct accountability.  
As discussed in section V, from the perspective of patients/ citizens, the 
main leverage they tend to have is the threat to exit, and when that is 
unavailable at least the use of voice to raise awareness and denounce 
misbehaviours and poor healthcare provision. As discussed above, key 
to the effectiveness of voice as a direct accountability mechanism are 
responsiveness of service providers and government officials and 
empowerment of patients.  
The degree of responsiveness of both policy makers and service 
providers can already be inferred from the analysis for the long 
accountability route where regime characteristics and sources of 
funding have been analysed. Additional information on empowerment 
of patients can be compiled in terms of access to or availability of 
participatory channels and access to meaningful information on patient 
rights, and availability and cost of health services. 
In sum, the guidelines presented here to assess accountability in the 
public provision of health services involve a broad mapping of the key 
institutional features and stakeholders across the short and long 
accountability routes and performing an accountability analysis 
evaluating the five components for accountable relations at key 
institutional junctions. These are guidelines that are meant to be 
theoretically informed by a sound definition and understanding of the 
concept of accountability, and still maintain the flexibility to adapt the 
analysis to each specific case of governance related concerns in the 
provision of public health services. 
8. Conclusion. Accountability and good 
governance: necessary but sufficient? 
Governance is a challenging subject to study and much more so to 
apply empirically. Yet, it is increasingly acknowledged to be a critical 
element impacting the success of developing countries’ efforts towards 
reforming their health systems to better address the need of the 
population. This paper represents an effort to advance the understanding 
and the empirical applicability of a key governance dimension, 
accountability, in the specific case of the delivery of public health 
services.  
Given the fact that health systems vary greatly across different 
countries, what has been proposed here is a set of general guidelines for 
assessing accountability in the public health system. Thus, it still 
remains the task of each individual researcher to adapt and tailor the 
analysis to the specific circumstances of each case. 
The guidelines place the emphasis on the assessment of formal 
institutions of the state and the health system. However, it should be 
kept in mind that where serious governance concerns exist in spite of a 
normative framework that is ‘technically’ conducive to accountable 
interactions it might be necessary to also evaluate the accountability 






relations that exist and take place outside of the formal institutional and 
regulatory framework. In states with weaker institutional capabilities, 
gross deviations between rules and observed behaviour can often reflect 
the importance of informal institutions and relationships.  
Finally, a note on the use of accountability analysis within a broader 
governance research agenda. Accountability is undoubtedly a key 
element conducive to good governance. Better accountability helps 
deter corruption and increase transparency in the public sector. 
However, it should be stressed that accountability, control of corruption 
and transparency are all attributes of how processes and operations are 
implemented within established institutions. They say nothing about the 
‘quality’ of the institutional framework itself. That is why also strategic 
vision in policy making and system design are also hugely important 
preconditions for good governance outcomes. In other words, an 
accountability assessment needs be placed in the context of a broader 
governance analysis to provide a full picture of the challenges to 
improve on systems performance. Such a governance analysis would 
include asking questions such as: Does the institutional setup make 
sense, is it functional and operational? Are social policies that are 
intended to be redistributive not actually regressive? What is the input 
of the relevant stakeholders in each policy area for policy design?    
Accountability as such is then not an end in and of itself. It is rather a 
tool to promote, in conjunction with good system and policy design, 
improved health systems performance that brings benefits to 
communities in a responsive and equitable manner. 
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